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ABSTRACT
In wireless systems, neighbor discovery (ND) is a fundamen-
tal building block: determining which devices are within di-
rect radio communication is an enabler for networking proto-
cols and a wide range of applications. To thwart abuse of ND
and the resultant compromise of the dependent functionality
of wireless systems, numerous works proposed solutions to
secure ND. Nonetheless, until very recently, there has been
no formal analysis of secure ND protocols. We close this
gap in [24], but we concentrate primarily on the derivation
of an impossibility result for a class of protocols. In this pa-
per, we focus on reasoning about specific protocols. First,
we contribute a number of extensions and refinements on the
framework of [24]. As we are particularly concerned with the
practicality of provably secure ND protocols, we investigate
availability and redefine accordingly the ND specification,
and also consider composability of ND with other protocols.
Then, we propose and analyze two secure ND protocols: We
revisit one of the protocols analyzed in [24], and introduce
and prove correct a more elaborate challenge-response pro-
tocol.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection
General Terms
Security
Keywords
wireless networks security, secure neighbor discovery, relay
attack
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems have been developed and
deployed in increasing numbers and for diverse technologies,
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enabling a broad spectrum of applications. Nonetheless, al-
though emerging wireless networking and mobile computing
technologies offer a new rich set of tools, they also open
the door to new vulnerabilities, primarily because wireless
communication makes eavesdropping and injection of mes-
sages easy. Realizing that attacks against a wireless system
can be perpetrated essentially anywhere and anytime, the
research community devised a large volume of solutions to
secure wireless networking protocols and applications.
Among these efforts, the problem of securing neighbor dis-
covery has received significant attention. Neighbor discovery
(ND), that is, discovering that a wireless device (node) is di-
rectly reachable without the assistance of any other device,
is a fundamental element for practically any wireless sys-
tem. As a result, an attack against ND, that is, misleading
nodes into believing they are neighbors when they are not,
does not merely introduce an artificial wireless communica-
tion link between the victim (misled) nodes. It is a simple
method to compromise and abuse the system functionality
that builds on ND: It is sufficient for the adversary to sim-
ply relay messages from one point to another in the network,
and vice versa, without any message modification, to stage
what is often termed a wormhole attack.
The consequences of such attacks can vary and be dev-
astating. Consider, for example, the neighbor discovery of
an access point (AP) performed by a mobile host in a WiFi
network that allows access to networked resources. A re-
lay attack may appear at first benign, or even helpful, as it
essentially extends the AP range. However, it offers the ad-
versary the opportunity to intercept and fully control com-
munications of mobile hosts that cannot reach the AP but
are ’attracted’ to do so over the wormhole setup by the at-
tacker. Similarly, for multi-hop wireless communication: In
a wireless sensor network, nodes are likely to send their mea-
surements to the sink over a path that includes a wormhole.
In a different setting, a relay attack can be the most effec-
tive pick-pocket or lock-picking mechanism: The adversary
approaches a victim user, carrying a radio frequency identifi-
cation (RFID) tag for payments or for opening a car, garage,
or office building door, she then relays communication be-
tween the RFID tag reader and the victim’s tag, when the
user is far from the RFID reader, and she gets a money
charge through or physically accesses the building.
The basic approach against such relay attacks has been
to protect the pair-wise execution of ND protocols with the
help of various forms of distance bounding (DB) [3, 15, 8]:
A node estimates its distance to another node by measuring
the signal time-of-flight (ToF) to and/or from that node; if
and only if the estimate is below a threshold, it declares it
a neighbor. In spite of numerous schemes that are built on
this approach, surveyed in Sec. 6, there has been no proof
that secure ND is indeed achieved. This gap was brought
forth very recently. [21] first argued informally that the
existing proposals left the problem largely open and pointed
out a common misconception in the notion of ND. Then,
[24] established that, indeed, even for the most basic form
of ND, what we term two-party ND, it is impossible for a
large class of protocols that rely on time measurements to
secure ND.
More important than the impossibility result per se, this
highlights the need to prove the properties of security proto-
cols. Developments over many years are not a substitute for
rigorous reasoning on the protocol properties. In fact, a false
feeling of trustworthy technology can lead to the deployment
of solutions (algorithms, protocols) that were never proven
secure. The subsequent discovery of attacks exploiting core
design flaws rather than implementation glitches could only
be a natural aftermath. The second important message that
one can extract from [24] is the need to carefully take into
consideration the idiosyncracies of the particular environ-
ment of the system to be secured. The basic observation be-
hind the impossibility result is otherwise seemingly straight-
forward: Obstacles or interference can prevent nearby nodes
from communicating directly, thus allowing the attacker to
remain undetected while misleading two near-by nodes into
believing they are neighbors (when they are not, precisely
because of such obstructions).
An impossibility result, although it provides important in-
sight into the problem at hand, does not provide solutions.
Another crucial question is proving the security of specific
ND protocols (under assumptions lifting the impossibility
result, obviously). We make a first step in this direction
in [24], proving correctness of a simple ND protocol. In this
paper, we continue on this path. We refine and extend the
framework of [24] (Sec. 2), providing a precise mathematical
model of a wireless network and the adversary. These refine-
ments and extensions bring our framework closer to the real
world, in terms of reasoning on protocol correctness, and
enable us to define the more elaborate challenge-response
(CR) ND protocols we introduce in this paper (Sec. 3.2).
We revisit one of the beacon (B) protocols considered in
[24], and investigate additional protocols in our technical
report [25]. Furthermore, we propose more practical avail-
ability properties (Sec. 3.1) than those geared towards and
sufficient for the quest for the impossibility result. Clearly, a
secure ND protocol concluding its execution correctly only
’once in a lifetime’ satisfies the specification in [24] but it
is not practical. In terms of further approaching practical
instantiations, we also consider composability: We aim at
results which hold when the secure ND protocols are used
along with other protocols. All these elements lead to a
precise problem specification, thus enabling us to develop
proofs for secure ND protocols (Sec. 4). Before we conclude,
we provide a discussion on the framework and the analysis
performed in this paper, identify open problems (Sec. 5),
and survey related work (Sec. 6).
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We are interested in modeling a wireless network: Its ba-
sic entities, nodes, are processes running on computational
platforms equipped with transceivers communicating over a
wireless channel. We assume that nodes have synchronized
clocks (although not all protocols we consider in this paper
make use of this assumption) and are static (not mobile).
Nodes either follow the implemented system functionality,
in which case we denote them as correct, or they are under
the control of an adversary, in which case we denote them as
adversarial nodes. Adversarial nodes can behave in an arbi-
trary fashion, also acting as correct nodes or lying dormant
for any period of time.
We model communication at the physical layer rather than
at higher layers (data link, network, or application), in or-
der to capture the inherent characteristics of ND in wireless
networks. For simplicity, correct nodes are assumed to use
a single wireless channel and omnidirectional antennas, but
we do not require them to have equal transmission power
and receiver sensitivity. On the contrary, adversarial nodes
use directional antennas to communicate across the wireless
channel used by correct nodes, but they can also communi-
cate across a dedicated adversary channel imperceptible to
correct nodes.
Our system model comprises: (i) a setting S that describes
the type (correct or adversarial) of nodes, their location and
the state of the wireless channel; (ii) a protocol model P
that determines the behavior of correct nodes; (iii) an adver-
sary model A that determines the capabilities of adversarial
nodes.
We assume that looking at the system at any point in
time reveals one or more phenomena. We are interested in
those relevant to the wireless communication and the sys-
tem at hand and thus to our analysis. We denote these phe-
nomena, associated with nodes, as events (Def. 3). Then,
we model the system evolution over time using the notion
of trace, i.e., a set of events (Def. 4). More precisely, we
use feasible traces, which satisfy constraints specified by S
(correspondence between wireless sending and receiving of
messages), P (correct nodes follow the protocol), and A (ad-
versarial nodes behave according to their capabilities). The
constraints are defined by logical formulas we call rules.
2.1 System Parameters
Our model includes a number of parameters, listed below,
which are determined by the technologies used by correct
and adversarial nodes.
• v ∈ R>0, the signal propagation speed, defining how
fast messages propagate across the wireless channel,
determined by the communication technology,
• vadv > v, the information propagation speed over the
adversary channel ; as vadv > v this is also the maxi-
mum speed at which information can propagate,
• Λ ⊂ 2R
3
, the set of antenna patterns that adversarial
nodes can utilize with their directional antennas,
• ∆relay ∈ R, the minimum relaying delay introduced by
a node when relaying a message; this delay is due to
processing exclusively, it does not include propagation
time or any other delay.
Further, V denotes the set of unique node identifiers, which
for simplicity we will consider equivalent with the nodes
themselves.1
1Although this implies that every node is assigned a single
identifier, it does not prevent an adversarial node from using
(in the messages in sends) any identifier.
2.2 Settings
A setting describes the type and location of nodes, and
how the state of the wireless channel changes over time.
Definition 1. A setting S is a tuple 〈V, loc, type , link ,nlos〉,
where:
• V ⊂ V is a finite set of nodes. An ordered pair (A,B) ∈
V 2 is called a link.
• loc : V → R3 is the node location function. As we
assume nodes are not mobile, this function does not de-
pend on time. We define dist : V 2 → R>0 as
dist(A,B) = d(loc(A), loc(B)), where d is the Euclidean
distance in R3. We require the loc function to be in-
jective, so that no two nodes share the same location.
Thus, dist(A,B) > 0 for A 6= B.
• type : V → {correct , adversarial} is the type func-
tion; it defines which nodes are correct and which are
adversarial. This function does not depend on time,
as we assume that the adversary does not corrupt new
nodes during the system execution. We denote Vcor =
type−1({correct}) and Vadv = type
−1({adversarial}).
• link : V 2 × R>0 → {up, down} is the link state func-
tion. Accordingly, we say that at a given time t >
0, a link (A,B) ∈ V 2 is up (denoted t ::A→B) or
down (denoted t ::A9B). We use abbreviations t ::A↔
B =def t ::A→B ∧ t ::B→A and t ::A=B =def
t :: A9B ∧ t :: B9A. We extend the “t :: A→ B”
notation from single time points to sets as follows:
T ::A→B =def ∀t ∈ T. t ::A→B. We establish the
convention R>0 ::A9A.
• nlos : V 2 → R>0 is the non-line-of-sight delay (NLOS)
function. If two nodes A and B can communicate
over a line of sight, then nlos(A,B) = 0. Otherwise,
nlos(A,B) specifies the additional distance that the sig-
nal has to propagate compared to line-of-sight propaga-
tion dist(A,B). We assume this function is symmet-
ric, because of reciprocity of wireless links.
We denote the set of all settings by Σ.
The ability to communicate directly, without the inter-
vention or ’assistance’ of relays, is expressed in our model
by a link being up, thus the following definition:
Definition 2. Node A is a neighbor of node B in setting
S at time t, if t ::A→B. If t ::A↔B we will say that nodes
A and B are neighbors at time t.
For simplicity in presentation, we use“t ::A→B”to denote
the neighbor relation and the link relation.
2.3 Message Space
The denote the set of all messages as M. Any of the
following is a message:
• an identifier A ∈ V,
• a timestamp t ∈ R>0,
• a location l ∈ R3,
• a nonce n ∈ Nonces.
Moreover, two messages m1,m2 can be concatenated to
form a message 〈m1,m2〉. Furthermore, an authenticator
authA(m), where A ∈ V and m ∈ M, is also a message.
2
Hence, messages are essentially terms, with the subterm re-
lation is denoted by ⊑.
Every message m has a duration |m| ∈ R>0, which de-
termines the transmission delay (not including the propa-
gation delay), reflecting the bit-rate of the underlying com-
munication technology. We assume that message duration
is preserved by concatenation, but not by an authentica-
tor. For m = 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mk〉, the duration is |m| =
|m1| + |m2| + . . . + |mk| and the position of mi in m is
pos(mi ⊑ m) = |m1|+ . . .+ |mi−1|, with pos(m1 ⊑ m) = 0;
in the case of multiple occurrences of m′ ⊑ m, pos(m′ ⊑ m)
gives the position of the first occurrence. When we use the
duration function for any concatenated message, we omit
the brackets: |m1,m2, . . . ,mk|. Finally, we assume that the
duration of identifiers, timestamps, locations, nonces and
authenticators in M is upper-bounded by some constant.
2.4 Events and Traces
We use the notion of trace to model an execution of the
system. A trace is composed of events. We model events re-
lated to the wireless communication and the ND protocols
operation. Each event is primarily associated with (essen-
tially, takes place at) a node we call the active node.
Definition 3. An event is one of the following terms:
• Receive(A; t;m)
• Bcast(A; t;m)
• Dcast(A; t;α;m)
• Fresh(A; t;n)
• Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′)
• NDstart(A; t)
• NDstart(A; t;B)
where A ∈ V is the active node, t ∈ R>0 is the event start
time, denoted by start(.), and m ∈ M, n ∈ Nonces, α ∈ Λ,
B,C ∈ V, t′ ∈ R>0.
Assuming that m1 ⊑ m2, we use Bcast(A; t;m1 ⊑ m2) to
denote the event Bcast(A; t − pos(m1 ⊑ m2);m2); likewise
for Dcast and Receive.
The first three events are related to communication on
the physical layer. Receive represents message reception.
Bcast represents sending a message with an omnidirectional
antenna. Dcast represents sending a message with a direc-
tional antenna using a pattern α ∈ Λ. The pattern α is
a subset of R3 indicating which nodes receive the message,
assuming the sending node A is located at (0, 0, 0). We use
the notation B ∈ α(A), meaning that loc(B) − loc(A) ∈ α.
The set of allowable antenna patterns, Λ, depends on the
antenna used by the adversarial nodes. We do not dwell on
the details of the structure of Λ, except for one requirement:
R
3 ∈ Λ; this is to ensure that adversarial nodes can use their
antenna in an omnidirectional fashion.
Fresh is used to declare that nonce n is (freshly) generated
by A at time t or, in other words, that it was not sent be-
fore t. The remaining three events are specific to neighbor
discovery protocols. Neighbor can be thought of as an in-
ternal outcome of a ND protocol (possibly reported to some
2The auth term represents an asymmetric authenticator,
such as a digital signature.
higher layer): Node A declares that B is a neighbor of C
at time t′. Having t′ a single point in time is for simplicity
only, and we could easily generalize to arbitrary sets. With
NDstart, node A declares that an instance of a ND protocol
has been initialized: either with a specific node B or with
all neighbors. Next, traces comprising the above events are
defined.
Definition 4. A trace θ is a set of events that satisfies
what we call the finite cut condition: for any finite t > 0,
the subset {e ∈ θ | start(e) < t} is finite.
The finite cut condition ensures that, during a finite amount
of time, only a finite number of events occurs; as settings
comprise a finite number of nodes, this is natural to demand.
We denote the set of all traces by Θ, and ΘS,P,A the set
of traces feasible with respect to a setting S , a protocol P
and an adversary A.
2.5 Setting-Feasible Traces
The feasibility of a trace θ with respect to a setting S =
〈V, loc, type , link , nlos〉 ensures a causal and strict time re-
lation between send and receive events; it is formally de-
fined by rules S1 – S4 (Fig. 1). Rule S1 ensures that ev-
ery message that is received was previously sent. Dually,
rules S2 and S3 ensure that a message broadcasted or sent
with a directional antenna is received by all nodes enabled
to do so by the link relation and, in the latter case, the
antenna pattern used. In other words, communication is
causal (a receive is always preceded by a sent), and reliable
as long as the link is up. Unreliability, expected and com-
mon in wireless communications, is modeled by the state of
the link being down. Furthermore, these rules introduce a
strict time relation between events, reflecting the propaga-
tion delay from A to B, across the channel, with speed v:
(dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1. Rule S4 is a technical one:
It ensures that no communication events are performed by
nodes not present in setting S , and that Bcast and Dcast
events are used exclusively by correct and adversarial nodes,
respectively. Note that this is not a restriction of the adver-
sary: Bcast(A; t;m) can be emulated (i.e., trigger exactly
the same Receive events) by Dcast(A; t;R3;m).
2.6 Protocol-Feasible Traces
Intuitively, a trace is feasible with respect to protocol P
if correct nodes behave according to P . Therefore the rules
that specify this type of feasibility are protocol-dependent
and are defined in Sec. 3.2. However, there is one general
rule that dictates the behavior of correct nodes with respect
to nonces. Rule F1 (Fig. 1) guarantees that if a nonce n
is freshly generated at time t (i) the node that generated n
will not broadcast it before t, (ii) any other correct node who
broadcasts a message containing nonce n must have receive
it (possibly in a different message) at least ∆relay before
broadcasting; this time difference is measured with respect
to the positions of the nonce in the respective messages.
2.7 Adversary-Feasible Traces
We consider a single adversary model denoted by A. Intu-
itively, adversarial nodes are allowed to send arbitrary mes-
sages, except for messages which would violate properties of
authenticators or freshness.
A trace θ is feasible with respect to A if rules A1 - A2
(Fig. 1) are satisfied. Rule A1 deals with authenticators: An
adversarial node is allowed to send a message containing ar-
bitrary authenticators, as long as they are generated by an
adversarial node (itself or other). This implies that adversar-
ial nodes can share cryptographic keys or any material used
for authentication. Furthermore, rule A1 reflects that the
adversary cannot forge authenticated messages: Any mes-
sage sent by an adversarial node that contains an authen-
ticator generated by a correct node must be a relayed one.
In other words, some (possibly the same) adversarial node
must have received a message containing this authenticator
earlier, at least ∆relay plus the propagation delay between
the two nodes over the adversarial channel. This condi-
tion reflects the structure of the adversarial channel: Any
two adversarial nodes can establish direct communication.
Rule A2 is similar to A1, but it is responsible for freshness:
An adversary sending a message with a nonce generated by
a correct can only be relaying the message (nonce). In this
sense rule A2 is an adversarial equivalent of rule F1.
3. ND SPECIFICATION AND PROTOCOLS
In this section, we propose four types of ND protocols and
their corresponding specifications. Due to limited space, we
investigate in detail only two types; more can be found in
our technical report [25]. We distinguish between (i) beacon-
based protocols (B-protocols), represented by PB/T, which
require the transmission of one message by one of the pro-
tocol participants and synchronized clock for both partic-
ipating nodes, and (ii) challenge-response protocols (CR-
protocols), represented by PCR/TL, which require a transmis-
sion of messages by both participants but no synchronized
clocks. Within and across these categories, we distinguish
protocols, as in [24], according to their capability to perform
time measurements (T-protocols) or time measurements and
location awareness (TL-protocols).
3.1 ND Properties
We consider two classes of properties ND protocols should
satisfy. The first class pertains to correctness and consists
of a single property, ND1 (Fig. 2): If two correct nodes3 are
declared neighbors at some time, then they must indeed be
neighbors at that time. More precisely, there are two cases:
(i) Node A can declare that B is its neighbor (i.e., A can
receive messages from B) or (ii) A can declare that it is a
neighbor of C (i.e., C can receive messages from A). In the
latter case, property ND1 requires link (C,A) to be up at
not exactly time t′, but rather dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1
(propagation delay) after t′. As our model mandates that
the link state is determined at the receiving end (node), if A
declares that it is a neighbor of C at time t′, a message sent
by A at t would be indeed received by C. In other words,
A is not forced to estimate the propagation delay to make a
correct neighbor statement.
The second class of properties pertains to availability : If
two nodes are neighbors for a long enough, protocol-specific
time TP , the protocol must declare them neighbors. In the
case of T-protocols, an additional notion needs to be intro-
duced to formulate satisfiable availability properties: neigh-
bor discovery (ND) range, R ∈ R>0. Typically, R is equal
to the nominal communication range for a given wireless
medium and transceiver technology, however, we useRmore
3The requirement that B and C be correct is explained in
the Sec. 5.
S1 ∀A ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m ∈ M. Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃B ∈ V. [t, t+ |m|] ::B→A
∧ (Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;m) ∈ θ ∨ (∃α ∈ Λ. A ∈ α(B)
∧ Dcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;α;m) ∈ θ))
S2 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m ∈ M. Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1;m) ∈ θ
∧ [t, t+ |m|] ::B→A) =⇒ Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ
S3 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m ∈ M, α ∈ Λ. (Dcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1;α;m) ∈ θ
∧ A ∈ α(B) ∧ [t, t+ |m|] ::B→A) =⇒ Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ
S4 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m ∈M, α ∈ Λ. (Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ V )
∧ (Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ Vcor) ∧ (Dcast(A; t;α;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ Vadv)
F1 ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t1, t2 ∈ R>0, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n ⊑ m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t2;n ⊑ m1) ∈ θ =⇒
(A = B ∧ t2 > t1) ∨ (A 6= B ∧ ∃δ > ∆relay,m2 ∈ M. n ⊑ m2 ∧ Receive(B; t2 − δ;n ⊑ m2) ∈ θ)
A1 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m,m0,m1 ∈ M, α ∈ Λ. m = authB(m0) ⊑ m1 ∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m ⊑ m1) ∈ θ =⇒
(B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (∃C ∈ Vadv, δ > ∆relay + dist(C,A)v
−1
adv,m2 ∈ M. m ⊑ m2 ∧ Receive(C; t− δ;m ⊑ m2) ∈ θ)
A2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ Vadv, t1, t2 ∈ R>0, α ∈ Λ, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n ⊑ m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ Dcast(B; t2;α;n ⊑ m1) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃C ∈ Vadv, δ > ∆relay + dist(C,B)v
−1
adv, m2 ∈ M. n ⊑ m2
∧ Receive(C; t2 − δ;n ⊑ m2) ∈ θ
Figure 1: Setting-, adversary- and common protocol-feasibility rules
ND1 ∀S ∈ Σ, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B,C ∈ Vcor, t, t
′ ∈ R>0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t
′) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ t′ ::B→A) ∨ (B = A ∧ (t′ + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1) ::A→C)
ND2B/T ∀S ∈ Σ, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R>0. NDstart(A; t) ∈ θ ∧ [t, t+ TP ] ::A→B
∧ dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) 6 R =⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [t,∞), t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(B; t
′;A,B, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2CR/TL ∀S ∈ Σ, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R>0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ [t, t+ TP ] ::A↔B
∧ nlos(A,B) = 0 =⇒ ∃t1, t2 ∈ [t,∞), t
′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(A; t1;A,B, t
′) ∈ θ
∧ Neighbor(A; t2;B,A, t
′′) ∈ θ
Figure 2: Selected ND properties.
freely as the communication range4 for which ND inferences
are drawn. In other words, nodes at a communication range
larger than R will not be required to declare each other
neighbor.
Fig. 2 displays two example ND2 properties for two types of
protocols we consider: B/T-protocols and CR/TL-protocols.
These two properties differ in four aspects, one depending
on whether the protocol is T or TL, whereas the other three
aspects depending on the protocol is beacon or challenge-
response. The first aspect is the NDstart event: For CR-
protocols, a particular neighbor B with which ND is started
is specified, whereas no such specification is necessary for
B-protocols. Second, it may be required that link (A,B)
be up in only one direction (B-protocols) or both directions
(CR-protocols). Third, for T-protocols an upper-bound on
propagation distance in enforced (dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B) 6
R), whereas for TL-protocols line-of-sight propagation is re-
quired (nlos(A,B) = 0). Forth, different forms of neigh-
bor declaration are possible. The node making the declara-
tion might be the same as (CR-protocols) or different (B-
protocols) from the one initiating the ND protocol. More-
over the declaration might be uni-directional (B-protocols)
or bi-directional (CR-protocols). Based on these differences,
we can derive two additional ND2 properties ND2B/TL and
ND2CR/T(detailed in [25]).
3.2 ND Protocols
Fundamentally, beyond authentication mechanisms, all the
ND protocols we consider measure the signal time-of-flight
(ToF) between two nodes: B-protocols, with tightly syn-
chronized clocks, are able to estimate ToF by transmitting
4By “communication range” we understand the actual dis-
tance plus NLOS effects.
a single beacon message, whereas CR-protocols require two
messages, a challenge and a response, for the same purpose.
T-protocols accept neighbor relations as valid if the ToF dis-
tance is below a threshold, as in [15], whereas TL-protocols
require this distance to be equal to the geographical distance
calculated based on nodes locations, as proposed in [24].
To make the presentation more approachable, we present
the protocols in the form of pseudo-code, based on which we
present the rules we developed to define the protocols. The
pseudo-code is divided into blocks starting with a triggering
event (on clause). If the triggering event occurs, the body
of the block is executed, i.e., other events take place.
We start with a simple B/T-protocol we denote PB/T,
which is essentially the temporal packet leash protocol pro-
posed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson in [15].
1: on NDstart(A; t1)
2: Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
3: on Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
4: if t2 − t1 6 Rv
−1
5: Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2)
Block 1-2 describes the behavior after the ND protocol
is started at node A (e.g., by a higher layer protocol); P1
and P2 (Fig. 3) are the two rules that correspond to this
block. Block 3-5 describes the behavior of a node after it
receives a beacon message, and it is modeled by rules P3
and P4. Rule P1 is straightforward: if ensures that if the
triggering event of block 1-2, NDstart(A; t1), occurs in the
trace, the event in the body of the block also occur. In
the same fashion, rule P3 is defined for block 3-5, with an
additional condition coming from the if clause.
These two rules are already sufficient to prove the ND2
property, but in a way, they only define half of aspects of
the the protocol functionality. Indeed, nothing prevents at
this point a node running this protocol from making arbi-
trary neighbor declarations. Rule P4 addresses this, stating
that if a node makes a neighbor declaration, this has to be
done according to block 3-5, i.e., the node had to receive a
“fresh enough” beacon message. Only one aspect remains:
Correct nodes are still allowed to broadcast arbitrary mes-
sages, including bogus beacon messages. This is addressed
by rule P2. To motivate the definition of P2, let us consider
an alternative rule would still be coherent with the pseudo-
code: If a correct node broadcasts a message at time t1, this
message is 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉. We can prove that such a de-
fined protocol satisfies the ND specification. However, this
is a weak result, precisely because that rule states that cor-
rect nodes cannot send any other messages than beacons.
If the ND protocol were used along with or by any other
protocol, obviously using other forms of messages, the re-
sult would no longer apply. To circumvent this undesired
composability restriction, rule P2 is defined as follows. It
only requires that if a correct node broadcasts at t1 a mes-
sage m of a particular form, i.e., containing authB(t) as a
subterm, then m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉. Hence, rule P2 gives
a much less restrictive condition on protocols that can be
securely composed with PB/T: basically, it mandates that
any other protocol does not use authenticated timestamps
of this form.5 Rule P4, in terms of composability, implies
that the node cannot run any other ND protocol (i.e., a pro-
tocol making neighbor declarations), but we do not see this
as a real restriction.
Next, we describe PCR/TL, a CR/TL-protocol. This pro-
tocol has a practical design twist: As authentication of a
message can be time-consuming process, in this protocol we
remove it from the time-critical ToF estimation phase. Oth-
erwise, if the response needs too much time to be calcu-
lated, the clock of the challenging node can drift beyond an
acceptable accuracy level. A protocol parameter ∆ ∈ R>0
determines exactly how long after the challenge reception a
node replies.
01: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
02: Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
03: Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
04: on Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉)
05: Fresh(B; t+∆;n2)
06: Bcast(B; t+∆; 〈n2〉)
07: let τ > ∆
08: Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉)
09: on Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉)
10: if occurred Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
11: if occurred Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
12: if occurred Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉)
13: if v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
14: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1)
15: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2)
Note that we assume that a node keeps track of all the
events it observes, and it can always refer to this ’history,’ as
in 10-12. Note also that there is no explicit block responsible
for receiving the 〈n2〉 response sent by B in 06, because
in this case node A does not take any action other than
5If this would pose a problem, the protocol can be modified,
by e.g., authenticating a timestamp concatenated with some
constant in place of simple the timestamp.
recording the event occurrence, for later reference in line 11.
Considering again that“triggering event implies block body
events,” rule P1 is defined for block 01-03, P2 for block 04-08,
and P4 for block 09-15. We do not define rules that restrict
the occurrence of Fresh events (in lines 02 and 05) or the
form of broadcasted messages (in lines 03 and 06), so that
there is no obstacle for composability. For line 08, rule P3
is defined: If a node broadcasts a message m containing a
authenticator of the form authB(n1, n2, l), then m precisely
the message defined in line 08, and all the other events from
block 04-08 occur. Finally, rule P5 is defined based on block
09-15. There is only one rule, despite two Neighbor events in
lines 14 and 15, because both events match the universally
quantified Neighbor event in P5; The rule uses a disjunction,
as there are (small) timing differences in the node behavior
depending on which of these two event is considered.
4. PROOFS
In this section we prove that two of the protocols we pre-
sented in the previous section satisfy the ND1 and ND2 prop-
erties. Before we proceed, we present two simple lemmas
which facilitate subsequent proofs. Lem. 1 deals with au-
thenticators and is an extension of rule A1, whereas Lem. 2
deals with freshness, extending S2 and F1. The proofs of
these lemmas are similar, hence we only present the former.
Lemma 1. Rule L1 (Fig. 4) holds for every trace θ feasible
with respect to the adversary model A and some setting S.
Proof. The 1st disjunct (B ∈ Vadv) follows immedi-
ately from A1, so we assume that B ∈ Vcor and focus on
the 2nd disjunct, which we prove by contradiction: Fix
m = authB(m0). Assume that Dcast(A; t;α;m ⊑ m1) ∈ θ,
but Bcast(C; t′;m ⊑ m2) /∈ θ, for any correct C, t
′
6
t−∆relay − dist(C,A)v
−1
adv and m2 st. m ⊑ m2 (⋆).
We use the following reasoning: Apply A1 to obtain
Receive(D; t − δ;m ⊑ m3) ∈ θ), where D ∈ Vadv and δ >
∆relay + dist(D,A)v
−1
adv. Next, apply S1 to get
Dcast(E; t−δ−(dist(E,D)−nlos(E,D))v−1;α′;m ⊑ m3) ∈
θ; the Bcast disjunct of S1 is ruled out by S4, assump-
tion (⋆) and vadv > v, as dist(D,A)v
−1
adv + (dist(E,D) +
nlos(E,D))v−1 > dist(E,A)v−1adv. This reasoning can be re-
peated ad infinitum, leading to an infinite number of Dcast
events in θ with start time below t. This is a contradiction
with the finite cut condition (Def. 4). Hence,
Bcast(C; t′;m ⊑ m2) ∈ θ for some correct C, t
′
6 t−∆relay−
dist(C,A)v−1adv and m2 st. m ⊑ m2.
Lemma 2. Rule L2 (Fig. 4) holds for every trace θ feasible
with respect to the adversary model A, some setting S and
rule F1.
Theorem 1. If T
PB/T
= sup{|A, t, authA(t)| | A ∈ V,
t ∈ R>0} + Rv
−1 and ∆relay > Rv
−1 protocol PB/T sat-
isfies ND1 and ND2B/T.
Proof. First, we prove ND1 (Fig. 2). Consider a setting S
and a trace θ ∈ Θ
S,PB/T,A such thatNeighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈
θ for A,B,C ∈ Vcor. As B is correct, apply P4 to get
C = B and Receive(A; t2; 〈A, t,1 authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ, where t =
t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| and t2 6 t1 +Rv
−1 (⋆). We need to
show that t2 ::A→B.
Apply S1 to get [t2, t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|] ::D→B and
either:
PB/T P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t1 ∈ R>0. NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ =⇒ Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t ∈ R>0, m ∈M. authB(t) ⊑ m ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ =⇒ m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R>0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 6 Rv
−1
=⇒ Neighbor(A; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A,C ∈ V, t2, t ∈ R>0. Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ =⇒ C = B
∧ ∃t1 ∈ R>0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 6 Rv
−1 ∧ t = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|
PCR/TL P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R>0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces.
Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R>0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n2 ∈ Nonces, τ > ∆.
Fresh(B; t+∆;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t+∆; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, C ∈ V, t ∈ R>0, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, l ∈ R
3,m ∈ M. authC(n1, n2, l) ⊑ m ∧ Bcast(B; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒
∃τ > 0. m = 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉 ∧ Receive(B; t− τ −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Fresh(B; t− τ ;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t− τ ; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
P4 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2, t ∈ R>0, l ∈ R
3.
Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l) =⇒
Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1) ∈θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2) ∈θ
P5 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t, t0 ∈ R>0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1 ∈ R>0, l ∈ R
3. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t0; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t0 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)) ∨
(B = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t2 ∈ R>0, l ∈ R
3. Fresh(A; t0 + |C|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t0; 〈C,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authC(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authC(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t2 − t0 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l))
Figure 3: Rules defining selected ND protocols.
L1 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R>0,m,m0,m1 ∈M, α ∈ Λ. m = authB(m0) ⊑ m1 ∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m ⊑ m1) ∈ θ =⇒
(B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (∃C ∈ Vcor, δ > ∆relay + dist(C,A)v
−1
adv,m2 ∈M. m ⊑ m2 ∧ Bcast(C; t− δ;m ⊑ m2) ∈ θ)
L2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R>0, α ∈ Λ, n ∈ Nonces, m ∈ M. A 6= B ∧ n ⊑ m ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ (Bcast(B; t2;n ⊑ m) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(B; t2;α;n ⊑ m) ∈ θ) =⇒ t2 > t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv +∆relay
Figure 4: Rules for Lemmas.
(a) Bcast(D; t2 − δ1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∨
(b) Dcast(D; t2 − δ1;α; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ.
where δ1 = (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v
−1. Consider case
(a). From S4 we get D ∈ Vcor and then from P2 D = A.
Thus t2 ::A→B, as desired.
Consider (b). Let τ = pos(authA(t1) ⊑ 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉).
Apply L1, to obtain for some δ2 > ∆relay and m st.
authA(t1) ⊑ m that Bcast(E; t2 + τ − δ1 − δ2; authA(t1) ⊑
m) ∈ θ. Refer to P2 to get E = A, m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉
and t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 < t2 −∆relay 6 t2 −Rv
−1. From the
latter derive t2 > t1 +Rv
−1. This is a contradiction with
(⋆), thus (b) cannot be true. Consequently, (a) is the only
valid option, and ND1 is satisfied.
Second, we prove ND2B/T(Fig. 2). Consider a setting S ,
where nodes A,B ∈ Vcor, dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) 6 R
and [t1, t1 + TPB/T ] :: A↔ B. Next, take any trace θ ∈
Θ
S,PB/T,A such that NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ. We need to show
that Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) for some t′ > t1 and t
′′ ∈
[t1, t1 + TPB/T ].
Start by applying P1 to θ to obtain
Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ. As link (A,B) is up for a
sufficiently long time, S2 implies
Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉), where t2 = t1+(dist(A,B)+
nlos(A,B))v−1. As t2 − t1 6 Rv
−1, P3 implies
Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2). Obviously, t
′ =
t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| > t1 and t
′′ = t2 ∈ [t1, t1 + TPB/T ],
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2. If ∆relay > 0, vadv = v and TPCR/TL = ∞,
protocol PCR/TL satisfies ND1 and ND2CR/TL.6
Proof. First, we prove ND1 (Fig. 2). Consider a setting S
and a trace θ ∈ Θ
S,PCR/TL,A such thatNeighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈
θ, where A,B,C ∈ Vcor. Apply P5 and arrive at two cases:
〈I〉 C = A: according to ND1, we need to prove t0 ::B→A
〈II〉 B = A: according to ND1, we need to prove
(t0 + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v
−1) ::A→C
We will consider both simultaneously. In case 〈I〉 P5 gives:
(1) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧
(2) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧
(3) Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧
(4) Receive(A; t3; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧
(5) v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
for some n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1, t3 ∈ R>0, l ∈ R
3 and t2 = t0
(⋆). In case 〈II〉, if we rename C to B, P5 gives (1) – (5) for
some n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t2, t3 ∈ R>0, l ∈ R
3 and t1 = t0 (⋆⋆).
We continue by applying S1 to (4) to obtain for some
D ∈ V :
6We set T
PCR/TL
= ∞ for simplicity: Otherwise, we would
need to assume a maximum distance between A and B to
have an upper-bound on the protocol execution time.
(a) Bcast(D; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∨
(b) Dcast(D; .; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
(“.” in place of start time means that we are not con-
cerned with the value.) Assuming (b), S4 implies D ∈ Vadv.
Apply L1 to obtain Bcast(E; .;m) for some E ∈ V and m st.
authB(n1, n2, l) ⊑ m Then P3 gives for some t4 ∈ R>0:
(6) Bcast(B; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧
(7) l = loc(B) ∧
(8) Receive(B; t4 −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧
(9) Bcast(B; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧
(10) Fresh(B; t4;n2) ∈ θ
The same is obtained under (a) via S4 and P3.
Apply S1 to (3) to get for some F ∈ V :
(11) [t2, t2 + |n2|] ::F→A ∧
(Bcast(F ; t′′; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(F ; t
′′; .; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ)
where t′′ = t2 − (dist(F,A) + nlos(F,A))v
−1. We have
two cases: (c) F = B and (d) F 6= B. For case (c), given
(10), F1 implies:
(c) F = B ∧ t4 6 t2 − (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1
In case (d), under (10), L2 implies t4 + dist(F,A)v
−1
adv +
∆relay 6 t
′′
6 t2 − dist(F,A)v
−1. Using v = vadv and the
triangle inequality we derive:
(d) F 6= B ∧ t4 6 t2 − dist(A,B)v
−1 −∆relay
Apply S1 to (8) to get for some G ∈ V :
(12) [t4 −∆, t4 −∆+ |〈B,n1〉|] ::G→B ∧
(Bcast(G; t′′′; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ∨Dcast(G; t
′′′; .; 〈B,n1〉)∈θ)
where t′′′ = t4−∆−(dist(G,B)+nlos(G,B))v
−1. Again,
there are two cases: (e) G = A and (f) G 6= A. In case (e),
given (2), F1 implies:
(e) G = A ∧ t4 > t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1 +∆
In case (f), given (2), L2 implies t1+|B|+dist(A,G)v
−1
adv+
∆relay 6 t
′′′+ |B| = t4−∆− (dist(G,B)+nlos(G,B))v
−1+
|B|. After simple transformations using the triangle inequal-
ity and v = vadv, and omitting the non-negative nlos :
(f) G 6= A ∧ t4 > t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1 +∆+∆relay
We now have four possible cases to consider: (c)+(e),
(c)+(f), (d)+(e) and (d)+(f). First, combine (5) and (7)
to obtain:
(13) t2 − t1 −∆ = 2dist(A,B)v
−1
In case (c)+(e), after some simple transformations we ob-
tain t2−t1−∆ > 2(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v
−1. Given (13),
this case is feasible if nlos(A,B) = 0. As F = B, (11) implies
t2 ::B→A, which is what we needed to prove in case 〈I〉 given
(⋆). Furthermore, G = A and (12) implies (t4 −∆::A→B).
In case (e) t4−∆ = t1+(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v
−1, which
given (⋆⋆) means that property ND1 is also satisfied in case
〈II〉. Finally, as ∆relay > 0, it is easy to see that the re-
maining three cases are in contradiction with (13), which
concludes the proof of ND1.
We now prove that ND2CR/TL holds. Assume that
NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ. We need to prove
Neighbor(A; t′1;A,B, t
′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t′2;B,A, t
′′) ∈ θ
for some t′1, t
′
2 ∈ [t1,∞), t
′, t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPCR/TL ].
First apply P1 to obtain Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ. Next,
as the link in up, Receive(B; t2; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ is implied by
S2, with t2 = t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1 (the theorem assumes
nlos(A,B) = 0). Apply P2 to get Bcast(B; t2 + ∆; 〈n2〉) ∈
θ and Bcast(B; t2 + τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ,
where τ > 0. Use the ‘link is up’ assumption and S2 to get
Receive(A; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
Receive(A; t5; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ, where t4 =
t2 + ∆ + dist(A,B)v
−1 = t1 + ∆ + 2dist(A,B)v
−1. As
v(t4−t1−∆) = 2dist(A,B) we conclude the proof by P4.
5. DISCUSSION
We introduced a number of abstractions in our frame-
work, simplifying wireless communications, for the sake of
modeling and reasoning on secure ND (Sec. 5.1). In Sec.5.2,
we outline here differences between protocols in terms of re-
quirements and satisfied properties, and sketch open prob-
lems in Sec. 5.3.
5.1 Abstractions and Simplifications
Mobility and NLOS Delay. We assume nodes are
static and NLOS delay constant over time. Otherwise, prop-
agation delay would vary during the transmission of a mes-
sage. In some cases, mobility and NLOS delay changes are
negligible for the ND protocol execution time scale. For
example, during 100µs, nodes moving at 100kmph traverse
2.7mm, which is below the accuracy of RF ranging systems
(in the order of centimeters [1]). However, in general, mobil-
ity can have security implications. To see why, consider the
PCR/TL protocol. If nodes move during the protocol execu-
tion, it is important when they estimate their location. At
the very least, A should estimate its location once when it
sends the challenge, and again when it receives the response;
whereas the responding node B should estimate its location
when it sends the response. But even this might be insuffi-
cient under high mobility: If A measures its location at the
beginning of the message, while B measures the ToF at the
end of the message, there may be space for a stealthy relay
attack. Introducing mobility and a dynamically changing
NLOS delay in our model is an interesting direction of our
future work.
Medium Access Control and Jamming. For sim-
plicity, we do not introduce any MAC restrictions into the
model. Hence, a node is able to simultaneously receive any
finite number of messages, even though in reality it is lim-
ited )to one message, or more for CDMA-like technologies).
We could introduce additional rules that model radio in-
terference, e.g., set links down if two (or more, depending
on the node transceiver capabilities) simultaneous transmis-
sions take place. However, this would not affect any of our
results. Notably, the availability properties require links to
be up, but they are agnostic as to why links are up or down.
Similarly, jamming would not affect our results either: we
capture jamming with links being down, thus availability
implies, among other things, no jamming.
Inaccuracies. We assume correct nodes have accurate
time and location information. However, in reality, inaccu-
racies are possible. Regarding time, clocks may be coarse-
grained, they can drift, especially if the synchronization pro-
tocol fails, or the node may encounter difficulties in estimat-
ing message reception times over a noisy channel. Regard-
ing location, infrastructure (e.g., Global Positioning System
(GPS), or base stations) providing location information may
be temporarily unavailable, or localization algorithms may
be coarse grained. Some of the inaccuracies can be de-
creased: For example, averaging ToF over many messages
decreases estimation errors. But some inaccuracy in time
and location is unavoidable.
As secure ND protocols rely on distance estimates, their
effectiveness can be affected by such inaccuracies. For T-
protocols, and even more so for TL-protocols, inaccuracies
hinder availability: they can lead to ToF estimates seem-
ingly above the threshold for T-protocols, and make the two
distance estimates diverge for TL-protocols. The only way
to cope with these is to introduce some tolerance margins
for measurements. Nonetheless, this would affect correct-
ness: The higher the tolerance margin, the more space is
left for fast relay attacks. This manifests the unsurprising
tension between correctness and availability. Introducing
inaccuracies explicitly into the framework is an interesting
component for future work.
Physical Layer Attacks. The messages considered in
our framework, albeit at the physical layer, are composed of
“atomic” components, such as nonces and identifiers, typi-
cally assumed in formal security frameworks. In [7], Clulow
et al. pointed out a number of physical layer attacks against
DB protocols, working at the symbol (or bit) level. In the
case of external adversaries, as considered in our ND spec-
ification, the attacks proposed in [7] can result in a (per-
ceivably) negative ∆relay. This can still be expressed in
our model, hence our framework (notably the “atomicity”
assumptions) is not limited with respect to those attacks.
However, this is not the case for internal adversaries, which
we discuss in the Open Problems section below.
5.2 Protocol Comparison
T-protocols versus TL-protocols. TL-protocols are
less restrictive than T-protocols in term of correctness: They
do not need the notion of ND range, R, needed by T-
protocols, and they are secure as long as ∆relay > 0 (al-
ways true, unless th above-discussed inaccuracies and at-
tacks come into play), while T-protocols require the ∆relay
above Rv−1. In contrast, TL-protocols suffer in terms of
availability: (i) they require location-aware nodes with se-
cure location information, a far from trivial requirement, and
(ii) they do not work for links with non-zero NLOS delay.
We make a small note here on the nature of NLOS com-
munication: Although there may be an obstacle between
two nodes, it can still be possible to calculate the LOS mes-
sage arrival time.7 This, however, requires special care when
selecting/designing a wireless receiver. Another practical
disadvantage of TL-protocols is their requirement that the
signal propagation speed be v = vadv (Note: it is reason-
able to assume vadv = c, the speed of light); this limits
TL-protocols to RF and other electromagnetic wave com-
munications, while T-protocols can be used for lower speed
technologies such as ultrasound.
B-protocols versus CR-protocols. B-protocols are
7If the LOS communication path is blocked by an obstacle,
conceptually simpler and have less stringent requirements
for availability, requiring that links be up for shorter periods
than those needed by CR-protocols. In contrast, B-protocols
require tightly synchronized clocks, thus being impractical
for many applications. In terms of correct (secure) oper-
ation, CRT-protocols require ∆relay, the minimum relaying
delaye, to be twice as large as that required by BT-protocols
(for the same R).
5.3 Open Problems
We observe that it is impossible to prove the correct-
ness of the original 1993 distance bounding (DB) proto-
col by Chaums and Brands [3] either in our framework or
in the framework by Meadows et al. [17] that deals with
DB protocols. First, the Brands-Chaum protocol uses com-
mitments and an XOR operation; although the XOR op-
eration is modeled in [17], it cannot be used as it is in
the Brands-Chaum protocol. More important, the Brands-
Chaum protocol includes a rapid-bit-exchange (RBE) phase,
during which nodes exchange single, fresh bits. This poses a
problem for the usual modeling of freshness, that is, a mes-
sage being fresh if it did not previously occur in a trace.
Obviously, fresh RBE bits will repeatedly occur in a trace,
as more than two will be exchanged.
The situation becomes even more interesting if we consider
internal adversaries, that is, the execution of an ND (or DB)
protocol with an adversarial node. In general, an attack
is always possible: An adversarial node can collude with
another adversarial node that is a neighbor of (is closer to)
the victim node, and have it execute the ND or DB protocol
on its behalf [3, 17]. However, with additional assumptions,
for example, that “there is only one adversary node” [3] or
that “nodes are prohibited to share cryptographic keys” [4]),
some security guarantees can be claimed.
Nonetheless, in the presence of internal adversaries, the
physical layer attacks in Clulow et al. [7] are much more
significant than in the presence of external adversaries. We
believe these types of attacks should be represented in any
framework to prove the security of ND or DB protocols
against internal adversaries. This would require a shift from
a model that considers messages to one that considers phys-
ical communication layer symbols. Interestingly, this re-
sembles the requirement to properly model the DB RBE.
But this should not be a big surprise: RBE was introduced
specifically to deal with internal attackers. The way to de-
velop these models remains an open question.
6. RELATED WORK
The prevalent wormhole prevention mechanism is based
on distance bounding (DB), which was first proposed by
Brands and Chaum in [3] to thwart a relay attack between
two correct nodes, also termed a mafia fraud. Essentially,
DB estimates the distance between two nodes, with the
guarantee that it is not smaller from their real distance.
Subsequent proposals contributed in aspects such as mutual
authentication [30], efficiency [9], operation in noisy envi-
ronments [18, 28], and resistance to execution of the pro-
the LOS component of the received signal will be attenu-
ated, and some NLOS components might arrive at the re-
ceiver with higher power. However, if the earlier-arriving
LOS component is not too weak, with enough care it can be
possible to detect it, calculate message reception time and
the resultant LOS propagation delay.
tocol with a colluding group of adversarial nodes [4, 27].
In the latter, the attack termed terrorist fraud is thwarted
under the assumption that adversarial nodes do not expose
their private cryptographic material; if not, one adversarial
node can undetectably impersonate another and successfully
stage a terrorist fraud. Authenticated ranging, proposed by
Cˇapkun and Hubaux in [29], lifts the technically non-trivial
requirement of rapid response (present in all the above pro-
tocols), at the expense of not being resilient to a distance
fraud, when the protocol is executed with a single, non-
colluding adversarial node [4]. Finally, two other ND proto-
cols that rely only on time measurements are the temporal
packet leashes [15] (recall the PB/T is essentially a temporal
packet leash) and TrueLink [8] (neither resistent to the dis-
tance fraud). The authors of [15] also proposed geographical
packet leashes, which rely on nodes being location-aware.
This protocol is quite similar to the TL-protocol introduced
in [24]. But we emphasize the difference: the latter protocol
requires clock synchronization as tight as that for temporal
packet leashes, making it essentially a combination of tem-
poral and geographical leashes, thus achieving secure ND in
an environment with obstacles.
A number of other secure ND schemes is proposed in the
literature. Most of them rely on other wireless nodes or in-
frastructure, which may be (sometimes) unavailable, e.g., in
WLAN or RFID systems. The approach of Poovendran and
Lazos [23] relies on trusted, location-aware nodes (guards)
to bootstrap ND. Hu and Evans have proposed a ND scheme
utilizing properties of directional antennas in [14]. In [16],
Maheshwairi et al. propose to use k-hop connectivity infor-
mation obtained with a non-secure ND mechanism, and to
inspect it for forbidden structures. Buttyan et al. also pro-
pose to use statistic of the connectivity graph, leading to a
centralized framework, in [5]. Another centralized approach
byWang et al. [31] uses approximate distance measurements
to visualize the network and enable a human operator to
detect a wormhole attack. Finally, Rasmussen and Cˇapkun
propose to use RF fingerprinting for secure ND [26]. Al-
though this is a promising approach, it needs more practical
investigation, notably about the feasibility of RF fingerprint
forging.
The relay attack has been investigated in some recent
works. One example is [10], where Hancke demonstrates a
relay attack using only off-the-shelf hardware components,
with a delay of around 20µs. In [27] Reid et al. discuss using
more sophisticated microwave repeaters to achieve nanosec-
ond level relaying delays. We also refer an interested reader
to a more theoretical work on relay (and other) physical layer
attacks on DB by Clulow et al. [7], with a practical follow-up
in [11], implementing some of these attacks against two com-
mercial radio receivers used in RFID and sensor networks.
Recently, there has been a rising interest in formalizing
analysis of security protocols in wireless networks. We men-
tion works focusing on the security of routing [19, 2, 20, 32],
local area networking [13], or broadcast authentication [12].
Closer to our work, the problem of DB has been treated for-
mally in [17] by Meadows et al. Their paper is concerned
with distance estimation rather than ND, but more impor-
tantly, the approach is different. The authors of [17] build
on top of existing formal approaches [6, 22] tailored for“clas-
sical” security protocols, and augments it with a notion of
distance based on time-stamps. However, it is not clear how
neighborhood would be defined in this framework, nor how
to model a protocol that uses location information, such as
PCR/TL. Beyond this, an interesting characteristic of their
approach is that there is no explicit notion of an adversary.
On the contrary, our approach starts with an explicit model
of a wireless environment, including node location, state of
wireless links, and an explicit adversary, controlling a num-
ber of nodes in the network. A potential advantage of this,
although not shown in this paper, is that attack scenarios
can be expressed in our model, whereas in [17] a collusion
attack is described in an informal manner.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate how to analyze and design
provably secure ND protocols, building on top of the frame-
work introduced in [24]. We contribute a number of exten-
sions that enable us to model and reason about more elab-
orate ND protocols (CR-protocols) than those previously
considered (B-protocols). Basically, our revised framework
(i) models additional practical aspects of wireless communi-
cations, (ii) caters to the co-existence and interoperability
of secure ND protocols with other wireless security proto-
cols, and (iii) focuses more than our work in [24] on sought
properties that are of practical relevance, in particular, per-
taining to the ND protocol availability.
We see this work as a step towards provably secure neigh-
bor discovery. We outline a number of possible extensions
to our framework, and open problems in the Discussion sec-
tion. Among those, the seemingly most interesting one is
to reason on secure ND protocols in the presence of internal
adversaries. The nature of protocols that could deal with
this type of adversarial behavior, as well as some recently
discovered attacks [7], mandate, in our opinion, a shift from
message-oriented to models that explicitly consider symbols
at the physical communication layer.
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